Ramy Zohdy – African Affairs Expert
Since the 1950s, Israel has persistently sought to present itself in Africa as a friendly ally, a development partner, an agricultural expert, and a sincere adviser to peoples who had only recently emerged from the era of colonialism. This was done through a carefully polished discourse, soft language, and projects that appeared, on the surface, to be technical and developmental, yet in substance were consistently far removed from any notion of innocence. Israel never entered Africa with the logic of balanced partnership, but rather with the logic of penetration. It did not view the continent as a field for development, but as an arena of influence, conflict, and geopolitical bargaining. Today, with its announcement recognizing what is called “Somaliland” — which is in fact the northwestern region of the Somali state and an integral part of its territory since independence in 1960 — the mask falls completely, revealing the true face of a state that has never hesitated to fragment countries, support secessionist movements, and feed political fragility whenever it deemed this to serve its narrow strategic interests.
Israeli recognition of Somaliland cannot be separated from a long history of organized intelligence activity across the African continent. According to unofficial estimates, since the 1960s Israel has established security and intelligence relationships with no fewer than thirty African states, some without any formal public declaration, and others under the guise of agricultural cooperation, security assistance, or police training. In many cases, this presence was linked to supporting internal actors at the expense of the national state, whether in South Sudan prior to secession, in Ethiopia during periods of ethnic unrest, or in the Sahel region where terrorism, separatism, and external interventions have become deeply intertwined. The outcome has always been the same: weaker states, more divided societies, and a regional environment perpetually on the brink of explosion.
In the case of the Horn of Africa, the picture becomes even more dangerous. We are speaking of one of the most fragile regions in the world, encompassing Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan, and South Sudan in its immediate vicinity, and suffering from a lethal combination of internal conflicts, weak state institutions, the spread of armed groups, poverty, and climate change. Somalia alone, according to World Bank reports, has seen its per capita GDP fall to less than 500 dollars annually, while more than six million people face acute food insecurity. Within this already crumbling context, Israeli recognition of a secessionist region is akin to striking a match inside a powder keg.
Israel fully understands that recognizing Somaliland is not merely a symbolic political stance, but a multidirectional strategic message. The first message is directed inward, to the Somali domestic arena, suggesting that the option of secession can obtain international backing, even if only partial, thereby encouraging other latent forces to contemplate the same path. The second message targets neighboring states, foremost among them Ethiopia, which has for years sought access to the sea and may view Somaliland as a potential gateway, reshuffling the cards in an extremely sensitive region. The third message is aimed at major regional powers, particularly Egypt, signaling that Israel is strongly present in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab equation, and is prepared to use fragmentation and selective recognition as tools of pressure and influence.
More dangerous still is that this recognition revives a highly perilous model in Africa: the legitimization of faits accomplis imposed by force, and the granting of political cover to entities that lack international recognition, outside the frameworks of the African Union and the United Nations. If generalized, this model threatens what remains of the concept of the nation-state on the continent and opens the door to an endless chain of secessionist demands.
African assessments indicate the existence of more than twenty latent or declared secessionist movements across the continent, from Cameroon to Mali, and from Nigeria to Mozambique. Recognizing any one of them, even partially, constitutes an extremely dangerous precedent.
Israel, which presents itself as a small, threatened state seeking security, practices in Africa the opposite of what it claims for itself. It does not support the stability of states, but rather invests in their fragility. It does not strengthen the rule of law, but deals with realities through excessive pragmatism. It does not respect territorial integrity, but bargains over it in exchange for bases, intelligence influence, or a foothold along strategic maritime corridors. It is no coincidence that this recognition coincides with escalating tensions in the Red Sea, with the growing importance of Bab al-Mandab — through which nearly 12 percent of global trade passes — and with the efforts of international and regional powers to redraw maps of influence in this vital area.
From an African perspective, and an Egyptian one in particular, what is happening in Somaliland is not a local matter, but an issue of regional national security. The fragmentation of Somalia means more chaos along the southern shores of the Red Sea, greater threats to international navigation, and wider vacuums filled by external powers that view Africa solely as an arena of conflict. This reality compels African states, and the African Union in particular, to adopt a firm stance rejecting unilateral recognitions, reaffirming respect for inherited borders, non-interference in internal affairs, and support for the national state rather than its dismantlement.
Israeli recognition of Somaliland is not an isolated event, but a dangerous indicator of a new phase in dealing with the continent — a phase more explicit in using tools of fragmentation and less concerned with old slogans of friendship and development. This calls for collective African awareness, one that understands that those who present themselves as friends may in fact be strategic adversaries, working patiently and shrewdly to weaken states from within rather than empower them. A continent that has paid such a heavy price for division and fragmentation cannot afford new adventures, poisoned recognitions, or additional tools of destruction added to an already fragile structure on the verge of collapse.
