By – Dr. Abdelnasser Solum Hamed
In conventional wars, the fall of a capital often signals the end of conflict , Sudan however, has defied this pattern. Following the Sudanese army’s recapture of Khartoum and much of the country’s central regions in 2025, the war did not conclude. Instead, it entered a more complex phase—one defined less by the question of who governs, and more by whether the state itself can reconstitute and project authority across its territory.
What was achieved in Khartoum can be understood as an operational success, but not a decisive strategic outcome. Control over a capital does not necessarily translate into control over the state.
In practical terms, statehood is reflected in the ability to regulate the full sovereign space, maintain continuity between the center and the periphery, and prevent the emergence of parallel structures of authority.
Where this capacity is weakened, the state may persist formally, yet function in a diminished or fragmented manner—what may be described here as a condition of “incomplete statehood.” From this perspective, the continuation of conflict after the recapture of Khartoum is not contradictory, but structurally consistent.
As the center of gravity shifted away from the capital, Kordofan emerged as a critical theater—not merely as a battlefield, but as a logistical hinge connecting western Sudan to its center. Control over this region influences supply flows from Darfur, and by extension, the sustainability of military operations. Its loss, conversely, allows these flows to persist, enabling the conflict to regenerate even after territorial setbacks. In this sense, the struggle in Kordofan is less about static territorial control and more about mobility and continuity.
What has further complicated this phase is the observable pattern of military operations. Advances by the army in one axis have not resulted in a cascading collapse across other fronts. Instead, pressure appears to be redistributed, with new fronts emerging as others intensify. As fighting escalated in Kordofan, the Blue Nile front became more active—not simply as a geographic extension of conflict, but as a shift that disperses military focus and complicates efforts toward decisive engagement.
The war in Sudan is no longer being won—it is being managed.
This pattern aligns with what is described in military literature as “operational dispersion,” a method that distributes pressure across multiple fronts to prevent concentration of force and delay decisive outcomes. Under such conditions, the capture of a position or locality does not conclude the conflict, as the operational environment remains open and fluid, allowing for repositioning and adaptation. Tactical gains, therefore, do not necessarily translate into strategic control.
The Blue Nile front assumes additional significance not only for its role in redistributing pressure, but also due to its proximity to Ethiopia, introducing a broader regional dimension. Borders in this area function less as rigid boundaries and more as permeable zones shaped by geography and cross-border social ties. Such environments are conducive to informal flows—of goods, resources, and fighters—where control over movement may be more consequential than control over territory itself.
Within this framework, Ethiopia’s role can be interpreted as indirect and nuanced rather than overt. Rather than engaging through explicit intervention, its influence may be understood in terms of what could be described as “low-visibility support,” whereby a degree of fluidity is maintained in border regions, allowing movement and logistical activity to continue without formal involvement. This does not necessarily imply a unified or declared policy, but reflects a pattern that may contribute to preventing decisive outcomes and sustaining a degree of equilibrium.
This behavior is better understood when situated within Ethiopia’s broader regional context. The country faces overlapping pressures, including tensions with Somalia following its agreement with Somaliland over maritime access, a complex relationship with Eritrea, and ongoing sensitivities with Egypt. Within such a setting, the emergence of a stable and cohesive Sudan could introduce additional strategic pressure. As such, a scenario in which Sudan remains in a condition of partial recovery may align with a broader logic of regional balance, rather than being solely a byproduct of internal dynamics.
Against this backdrop, developments in the Blue Nile cannot be separated from internal shifts within the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The emergence of commander Hamouda Abu Shanab (“Al-Bishi”) as a key figure followed the killing of Abdulrahman Al-Bishi in July 2024, an event that created a leadership gap within that operational sector. His appointment appears to reflect accumulated experience in logistics and intelligence, providing familiarity with supply networks, local alignments, and operational terrain, alongside a record of field engagement.
As the conflict has evolved, alliances and local intersections have gained importance. In this regard, interactions between RSF elements and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N), led by Abdelaziz Al-Hilu, with field commanders such as Joseph Tuka active in the area, suggest a pattern of pragmatic coordination shaped by geography and overlapping zones of influence. This dynamic has enabled the opening of new routes for movement and supply, contributing to the reactivation of southern operational spaces.
At the same time, social and tribal networks appear to play a role in consolidating leadership structures, as armed formations in such environments often rely on trusted networks to maintain cohesion—particularly in regions like the Blue Nile, where local dynamics intersect with broader regional considerations.
Within this evolving landscape, leadership in this front extends beyond tactical command to assume a strategic function—focused on securing alternative supply routes, redistributing pressure, and keeping the operational space open. This reinforces the understanding of the Blue Nile not merely as a battlefield, but as an instrument in the broader management of the war.
Meanwhile, the role of key actors is also shifting. The Rapid Support Forces can no longer be understood solely as a faction seeking control of power. Rather, due to their presence in peripheral regions and their operational mobility, they function as a factor that contributes to the persistence of conflict. Their positioning outside the center, combined with their links to supply networks, gives them a role that extends beyond direct combat, embedding them within the structural dynamics of the war itself.
As this pattern continues, the function of borders is being transformed. They are no longer fixed lines separating states, but tools for managing conflict—serving as supply corridors, zones of influence, and points of pressure. In this context, Sudan does not formally fragment, but experiences a loss of functional cohesion, entering a condition of fragmented sovereignty where the state exists, but does not operate at full capacity.
This situation is further reinforced by the emergence of a parallel war economy, sustained by smuggling networks, informal trade, and cross-border activity. These dynamics create incentive structures that make the continuation of conflict more beneficial for certain actors than its resolution. In such an environment, war does not require victory to persist—it only requires the absence of an effective state.
Ultimately, the conflict in Sudan is no longer merely a struggle for power. It has become a gradual process of reshaping the state from its peripheries—redistributing influence and redefining the relationship between center and margin. The state may succeed in reclaiming its capital, but the real challenge lies in reclaiming its peripheries, for a state is not measured by what it controls at the center, but by what it is able to govern at the margins.
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