Ambassador Dr. Mohamed Hegazy Writes : The Nile Basin Commission Between Genuine Cooperation and the Logic of Majority

Like everyone concerned with the Nile water issue, I followed with interest the statements made by Ethiopia’s Minister of Water and Energy, Habtamu Itefa, regarding Egypt’s position on establishing a permanent commission for the Nile River Basin. His remarks included accusations that Cairo and Khartoum are obstructing the establishment of such an institution, as well as the assertion that the Cooperative Framework Agreement has become the legal and institutional framework for managing the shared resources of the Nile. He also claimed that Egypt’s reservation represents opposition to the principle that “the Nile belongs to everyone.”

These statements call for a systematic and legal clarification, because the essence of the dispute is not about whether there should be cooperation or not, but rather about the form of this cooperation, its rules and its legal reference, and whether it is possible to establish an institution to manage a shared international river without the participation of all its riparian states and then consider it an institution representing the entire basin.

For clarification, Egypt’s position on this issue is not based on a principled rejection of institutional cooperation, but on a clear legal and political vision grounded in the rules of international law governing international rivers and in successful African experiences in managing shared river basins.

Egypt is not opposed to cooperation among the Nile Basin countries, nor is it opposed to establishing permanent institutions for cooperation. Cairo has repeatedly affirmed its commitment to working through the Nile Basin Initiative as the comprehensive and only framework capable of bringing together all ten Nile Basin countries. However, an institution that does not include all the basin countries cannot be considered representative of the basin. This is the essence of the legal and institutional problem raised by the recent Ethiopian statements.

If a group of basin countries has ratified the Cooperative Framework Agreement, this gives the agreement legal effect with respect to the countries that have become parties to it. However, this does not mean that it has become binding on countries that have not acceded to it.

Even if the commission has become legally established with respect to the states that are parties to it, presenting it as the sole institution representing the entire Nile Basin remains problematic as long as major basin countries have not accepted the same legal framework.

Egypt has clearly called for refraining from taking hasty institutional steps before reaching comprehensive consensus at the basin level. This is because transforming the current initiative into a sub-regional organization concerning a group of upstream countries, and then presenting it as the “Nile Basin Commission,” represents a dangerous step that threatens the unity of the basin and undermines the prospects for comprehensive cooperation.

Perhaps the Ethiopian minister is unaware—or, although I believe he deliberately omitted it, failed to mention—that efforts are currently underway by the group of Nile Basin Initiative countries, through a committee chaired by South Sudan and Uganda, to visit the countries that have not signed the framework agreement in order to learn about the reasons for their reservations and attempt to overcome those obstacles.

The committee continues its work in full cooperation with Egypt and Sudan. This reflects a responsible approach by the other Nile Basin countries, while it appears that Ethiopian officials have become prisoners of distorted facts and are adopting an approach that ignores these facts in order to serve policies harmful to the basin countries and to security and stability in their regional surroundings.

Africa’s own experiences provide more mature models than the logic of conflict between upstream and downstream countries. If the objective is to manage international rivers jointly, Africa offers important models that are not based on the logic of majority versus minority.

The Senegal River Development Organization (OMVS), the Gambia River Basin Development Organization (OMVG), and the Zambezi Watercourse Commission (ZAMCOM) are all institutional models based on the participation of the riparian states throughout the basin, rather than excluding any of them.

These models tell us something important: the management of an international river does not succeed through the logic of upstream countries confronting downstream countries, but through the logic of the entire basin, based on balance, equity and participation. This is the approach advocated by Egypt, rather than the approach proposed by Ethiopia, which is based on turning an institution representing a minority into an institution representing the majority.

On this basis, international law no longer recognizes the concept of absolute sovereignty over an international river. This is an important legal fact that must be present in any serious discussion about the future of Nile waters.

The Ethiopian discourse is based on the argument that Ethiopia is a sovereign state and therefore has the right to do whatever it wishes within its territory. However, an international river is not merely a part of national territory; it is a shared resource whose uses affect other states.

The United Nations International Law Commission has discussed, since the 1970s, theories concerning states’ uses of international rivers and rejected the modern development of the concept of absolute territorial sovereignty, which would grant an upstream state unlimited freedom in using water.

The International Court of Justice, in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, affirmed that the principle of “common interest” is the basis for managing international watercourses, and that claims of absolute sovereignty over shared water resources are incompatible with the principles of international law.

Therefore, saying that the Nile “belongs to everyone” should lead to cooperation, not domination.

If we agree with the Ethiopian minister when he says that the Nile is a shared resource and that the basin countries must preserve, manage and develop it jointly, Egypt sees no problem with that. This is precisely the principle that we support.

However, if the Nile “belongs to everyone” means that all its countries share responsibility for it, then the logical consequence is that no single country can unilaterally manage the river’s flows, just as a group of upstream countries cannot unilaterally establish rules governing the entire basin.

Joint management means joint participation. This is the difference between genuine cooperation and using a regional institution as a tool to reshape the river’s balance in favor of one party at the expense of another.

Perhaps one of the most important points that must be emphasized in this context is that Egypt does not fear Ethiopian development, but objects to unilateral management of the international river.

Development is one thing, while managing the flows of an international river is something entirely different.

Egypt’s objection is not to electricity generation in Ethiopia, but to any policy that leads to monopolizing control over the flows of the Blue Nile or establishing a series of major projects without a binding legal framework that protects the interests of the downstream countries.

This issue has become more pressing with talk of additional projects on the Blue Nile, which changes the nature of the question altogether.

The question is no longer merely how a single dam will be managed, but how an entire system of dams on a single international watercourse will be managed.

Here, the urgent need emerges for a clear legal framework defining the rules governing notification, data exchange, operation, management of prolonged drought periods, coordination among dams, and assessment of the impacts of new projects.

These are not exceptional Egyptian demands. They represent the logic of sound management for any international river basin.

It is unfortunate that the Ethiopian minister’s recent statements come at a time when the region needs tension reduction and confidence-building, rather than deepening division.

When the Ethiopian official says that his country can continue developing the Nile’s resources without being constrained by objections from the downstream countries, the political message reaching Cairo and Khartoum is not one of cooperation.

And when he speaks of Egypt and Sudan as representing a “minority” against a majority of the basin countries, he turns a complex legal and technical issue into a matter of political voting. This does not serve Ethiopia itself.

If Ethiopia truly wants to become a regional center for energy and economic integration, its best investment is confidence, not deepening mistrust; stability as an entry point for development.

Statements that increase tension and division do not serve this objective in any way.

At the same time, Egypt has an extensive record of cooperation with the countries of the White Nile and East Africa, and this record must be taken into account when assessing Egypt’s position.

Egypt’s relations with the countries of the White Nile Basin and East Africa have witnessed broad development in recent years in the fields of development, infrastructure, energy and water.

The Julius Nyerere Dam project in Tanzania represents a clear example of Egypt’s ability to participate in a major African development project with a Nile Basin country, in a manner that achieves shared development interests.

Egypt also maintains developing strategic and historic relations with Kenya, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi and other African countries.

Indeed, its cooperation extends along the Red Sea coast, with ports linked from Ain Sokhna to Port Sudan and to the ports of Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia, down to Kenya and Tanzania and reaching Angola, Mozambique and South Africa.

This giant economic corridor, if we add to it the east-west land connection represented by the Safaga-N’Djamena route through Chad, makes clear the value of broad regional cooperation that Ethiopia has not yet fully recognized—a form of cooperation capable of generating benefits for everyone far greater than those that can be achieved through policies of domination over water resources.

What is required today is neither a commission for the upstream countries nor a commission for the downstream countries, but a genuine commission for the entire basin.

Egypt does not want an institution controlled by upstream countries, nor does it want an institution controlled by downstream countries.

Egypt wants an institution representing the entire Nile, from the Nile’s sources to its mouth, from Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan, Sudan and Egypt, according to a formula agreed upon by everyone.

But for an institution comprising a group of countries to become an institution claiming to represent the entire basin while other countries remain outside it does not achieve the real objective of integration. Rather, it undermines it and increases division.

It is worth noting here that the experience of negotiations over the past years reveals that the crisis of confidence is much older than the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

Based on my participation in a number of rounds of Nile water negotiations, I can say that the problem of confidence did not begin with the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, but has deeper roots.

Previous negotiations witnessed serious attempts to reach compromises.

During one round of negotiations in Bujumbura in 1997, we reached a consensual formula regarding one of the disputed points related to Article B14, which could have provided guarantees for the existing uses of Egypt and Sudan.

The Ugandan proposal at the time was an attempt to reach a compromise that would preserve the interests of both upstream and downstream countries.

However, this consensus did not last. After a short period, Ethiopia returned to a different position and began moves among the upstream countries to rebuild a collective position that prevented the continuation of the consensus that had been reached.

This incident is not an attempt to settle a historical score, but it proves that the current crisis of confidence has old negotiating roots, and that the problem is not a particular institutional formula as much as it is the absence of a genuine will to reach a comprehensive and balanced solution, to implement hidden plans and gain time.

Therefore, the failure of negotiations is clearly attributable to the undisclosed ceiling of the Ethiopian position, bad faith, and the inability to understand the firmly established needs of the two downstream countries since the emergence of this river.

It is no exaggeration to say that regional and international powers have encouraged pressure on Egypt through the water issue and helped turn the Ethiopian dam into an instrument of political pressure against the Egyptian position.

It is also important to point out that negotiations require a clear negotiating ceiling and a genuine will to reach a solution. This is what the negotiating process with the Ethiopian side lacked.

One of the most important rules of negotiation is that each party enters negotiations knowing its objectives and limits, and that there is a genuine will to reach a settlement.

What we faced during the years of negotiations was the absence of a clear Ethiopian negotiating ceiling, while the Ethiopian vision for the future of the Blue Nile’s water resources gradually evolved.

Today, with talk of three additional dams, the importance of this question becomes even clearer.

If there is a strategic vision for building a multi-dam system on the Blue Nile, this should be an explicit subject in any negotiations.

However, Ethiopia chose a policy of concealment in order to push its first dam through, and I believe it will be difficult, indeed impossible, to imagine Egypt accepting a fait accompli.

The Ethiopian decision will have serious consequences, and Ethiopia will be responsible for them.

When Ethiopia negotiates while concealing its intentions, it is not acceptable to negotiate each stage as though it were an independent project, because the accumulation of projects on the same river can produce an impact entirely different from that of each individual project.

This makes discussion of a comprehensive and binding legal framework more urgent than ever.

In this context, it must be emphasized that international law does not grant Egypt an absolute right to the waters of the Nile, just as it does not grant Ethiopia an absolute right to control it.

Egypt must be precise and fair in presenting its position. It should not claim that international law gives it an absolute right to every drop of Nile water, just as Ethiopia cannot claim that international law gives it absolute freedom to control the Blue Nile’s waters.

The law governing international rivers is based on balance.

The International Law Commission has affirmed that the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty over an international river is not the rule established by the modern development of international law.

At the same time, modern international watercourse law has affirmed the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization, participation and consideration of the interests of riparian states.

This is the rule that should govern the future, rather than the logic of majority that Ethiopia is attempting to promote.

Egypt views the Nile within a broader framework of African integration and does not view African cooperation solely from the perspective of water.

There is a broader vision for connecting East and North Africa through ports, roads, energy networks and trade.

The Red Sea system could be integrated from Ain Sokhna to Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia, and then through East Africa to Kenya and Tanzania, with possibilities for connections southward and westward, in addition to east-west land corridors such as the Safaga-N’Djamena route.

These networks could transform the Red Sea, the Nile Basin and East Africa into an interconnected economic space.

Here, specifically, I believe Ethiopia has not yet invested sufficiently in the strength of regional cooperation, focusing instead on a unilateral approach that harms its relations with its neighbors and undermines opportunities for broad economic integration capable of generating benefits for everyone far greater than those that can be achieved through policies of domination over water resources.

In conclusion, I say to the Ethiopian minister, with all due respect and clarity: Egypt does not oppose Ethiopia becoming a strong state, nor does it oppose its right to development.

But Ethiopia should not confuse sovereignty over territory with absolute sovereignty over an international river, nor should it confuse a majority of states supporting a particular framework with the consensus required to manage an international basin in a comprehensive and sustainable manner.

If the Nile truly “belongs to all of us,” then its management must serve all of us.

If Ethiopia wants cooperation, Egypt extends its hand for cooperation.

And if it wants a permanent institution, Egypt does not reject the institution. Rather, it wants a genuine institution for the entire basin, a law that protects everyone, joint management of the river, development for Ethiopia, water security for Egypt and Sudan, and joint development for all the basin countries.

This is not a position against Ethiopia. Rather, it is a position consistent with the essence of modern international law governing international rivers and with successful African models of cooperation that have demonstrated that the continent is capable of moving beyond the logic of conflict between upstream and downstream countries.

The Nile can become a bridge for African integration, but it will not do so if it is turned into an instrument of domination or a battleground between upstream and downstream countries.

Ultimately, the choice is not between Egypt and Ethiopia, but between cooperation and domination, and between managing the river in the interests of everyone or managing it according to a fait accompli.

Here, specifically, Ethiopia should stop viewing Egypt’s reservations as an obstacle to cooperation and instead regard them as a call to build a comprehensive legal framework that leaves no Nile country outside the equation governing the management of its shared river.

The Ethiopian minister’s recent statements, which increase tension and division, serve the interests of no party. They remind us that over twelve years of negotiations, Ethiopia has obstructed every opportunity to reach solutions, entered negotiations in clear bad faith, and concealed its future intention to build multiple dams in order to achieve full control over the Blue Nile.

This places the region before a difficult choice. But the more difficult choice is to continue with a policy of procrastination and stalling that makes the fait accompli the only starting point, something that cannot be accepted or tolerated.

Ethiopia knows, without any ambiguity, that by putting forward its three proposed dams, it has come close to threatening the core areas of Egyptian national security and its red lines.

This could draw the situation into an area that we may not want to enter, but if it is imposed upon us, there will be no alternative but to resort to it in accordance with the rules of international law and the United Nations Charter, particularly Article 51, which guarantees states the right to defend their national security if it is threatened, pending a decision by the Security Council on the matter.

I believe that the Ethiopian government is aware of this, as are the major regional and international powers concerned with the security and stability of the Horn of Africa, which is strategically linked to maritime security in the Red Sea, the security of the Gulf, international trade flows and military fleets.

I recall a meeting with Mr. Hailemariam Desalegn, Ethiopia’s former Minister of Water and Irrigation and former Prime Minister, with African ambassadors in Berlin.

I expressed to him my concern about the future of relations between the two countries, particularly in light of the tensions we were witnessing and the risks I was monitoring as a scholar of the water issue.

He stated, verbatim, that he was also a scholar of the water issue and that throughout the history of this issue, it had long been said that “the kings of Abyssinia would cut off the water from Egypt, and that Egypt would fight Abyssinia; throughout the years, Abyssinia did not cut off the water from Egypt, and Egypt did not fight Abyssinia.”

Therefore, I hope in conclusion that Desalegn’s statement remains valid, because never before has the water and existential threat resulting from unilateral Ethiopian actions reached this level of persistence in unilateralism and intransigence, threatening the stable equation between two peoples who are heirs to ancient civilizations and share a sense of belonging to a continent that has struggled for the sake of its peoples.

We hope that wisdom and reason will prevail, and that decisions and measures concerning a river granted by God to the basin countries—not to Ethiopia alone—will cease.

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