As the New Delhi Summit convenes on 12-13 September 2026, BRICS finds itself facing the most fateful moment in its short institutional life. What began in 2009 as a loose acronym for four emerging economies has grown into a coalition of fifteen members spanning four continents, Yet size alone does not guarantee importance, The group now stands at a genuine crossroads: it will either mature into a practical engine of reform in favor of the Global South, or it will fragment under the weight of its own contradictions and external pressures. Given its importance—to its members and to the wider world—its success depends on the path it chooses.
It is difficult to ignore the significant economic argument in BRICS’s favor. The bloc now represents nearly half the world’s population and about forty percent of global GDP. Intra-BRICS merchandise trade has jumped from just $84 billion in 2003 to $1.17 trillion in 2024. As we note, these are not abstract figures; they reflect real supply chains, markets, and interdependence. For developing nations long excluded from Western-dominated institutions, BRICS offers something rare: a forum that allows each member state to translate its demographic and economic weight amid a climate of trust and mutual dependence.
More importantly, the agenda has become practical and serves the interests of each state. The New Development Bank, local currency settlement mechanisms, and proposals to link fast-payment systems such as India’s UPI and Brazil’s Pix all aim to reduce vulnerability to external shocks and sanctions. With 67 percent of intra-BRICS trade already settled in local currencies, the ambition is no longer theoretical. If we add to this cooperation in artificial intelligence, digital public infrastructure, and energy security, BRICS begins to appear less like a talking shop and increasingly like a delivery mechanism for the Global South.
The Case for Caution
Yet the centrifugal forces are equally real. The group is divided: among its members are those who see it as a tool to confront the West—foremost among them Russia, China, and Iran—and members on the other hand who prefer practical cooperation without severing Western ties, such as India, Brazil, Egypt, and the UAE.
This is not a secondary philosophical disagreement; as I see it, it shapes and intervenes in the drafting of every statement, every joint declaration, and every summit declaration, The rift between Iran and the UAE has already complicated consensus-building, while unresolved border tensions between India and China cast a long shadow over the proceedings, BRICS’s closing statements, and its position on international issues. Any coalition that cannot agree on its own purpose cannot honestly claim to lead on a complex and divided international stage.
There is also the risk of overreach in membership and its impact, Expanding membership from four to fifteen states broadened representation but diluted and threatened consensus and cohesion. Every new member brings its own grievances, alliances, and red lines. Without a clear institutional framework for managing disagreement, BRICS risks becoming a forum where everyone speaks and nothing is decided—a fate that has befallen many well-intentioned multilateral experiments.
The Real Stakes
What makes this crossroads so important is that the world needs BRICS to succeed—not as an anti-Western bloc, but as a practical alternative capacity and a platform for a pluralism that does justice to the countries of the South. The current architecture of global governance, built from the ashes of World War II in 1945, no longer reflects the distribution of economic and demographic power. If BRICS can act as a pressure forum to achieve that reform in favor of the Global South, it serves an important purpose and restores the pluralist framework of international relations.
But its importance also lies, from many perspectives, in what it can build, not what it can oppose. If it becomes merely a tool of geopolitical grievance, it will squander its most valuable asset: the ability to bring together nations that disagree on much but share a common interest in a more pluralistic world order that respects the rights of the South. The test, as I see it at the New Delhi Summit, is whether BRICS can move from symbolism to substance—from declaring its weight to exercising it responsibly.
The crossroads, in short, is not about whether BRICS is important, but about whether BRICS can be important in a good and effective way.
read more
