Ethiopia’s 2026 Elections Under the Shadow of Threats and Exclusion: Will Abiy Ahmed Renew His Legitimacy or Will Federal Authority Be Shaken?
Ramy Zohdy — African Affairs Expert
As Ethiopia prepares to hold its general elections on June 1, 2026, the country stands before one of its most complex political milestones since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018, These elections are not merely a contest among political parties for parliamentary and regional council seats; they constitute a real test of the Ethiopian state’s ability to regenerate political legitimacy after years of civil wars, ethnic conflicts, and successive economic crises.
Although the electoral landscape appears, on the surface, to reflect a broad democratic process involving millions of voters, thousands of candidates, and dozens of political parties, a deeper strategic reading reveals that these elections are taking place within an exceptional political and security environment. As a result, their significance is tied more closely to the future of the Ethiopian state itself than to the formation of a new government.
Official data indicate that the number of registered voters has exceeded 54 million, compared to approximately 37.4 million in the 2021 elections—an increase of nearly 44 percent within a single electoral cycle. In theory, this figure reflects expanding political participation; however, it also illustrates Ethiopia’s rapid population growth, which has made it Africa’s second most populous nation, with more than 125 million inhabitants.
A total of 48 political parties and more than 10,900 candidates are competing for various positions, including 2,198 candidates for the House of Peoples’ Representatives and 8,736 candidates for regional councils. Yet the large number of candidates and parties does not necessarily indicate balanced competition. Most assessments point to the continued political and ethnic exclusion of key actors, alongside the overwhelming dominance of the ruling Prosperity Party, which currently controls more than 80 percent of parliamentary seats.
Any political party requires at least 274 seats out of the 547-seat parliament to form a government. However, current realities make it difficult to envision a scenario in which the Prosperity Party loses its majority, particularly given the fragmentation of the opposition, its organizational weaknesses, and the continued boycott or effective absence of several influential political forces.
From a geopolitical perspective, the importance of these elections lies not in identifying the winner but in measuring the degree of legitimacy that the winner will ultimately secure. Ethiopia’s political institutions have been facing a prolonged crisis of confidence due to the war in Tigray, the conflict in Amhara, and the continuing instability in Oromia.
Perhaps the most alarming indicator of the 2026 elections is the exclusion of 46 electoral constituencies from the voting process, including all 38 constituencies in the Tigray region and eight constituencies in the Amhara region. Consequently, voting will not take place in areas that constitute significant components of Ethiopia’s political map, raising fundamental questions about the inclusiveness of the elections and their ability to represent the country’s full national will.
The exclusion of Tigray carries implications that extend far beyond procedural considerations. More than three years after the signing of the 2022 peace agreement, the consequences of the war continue to cast a long shadow over the region. The absence of elections there reflects the ongoing uncertainty surrounding relations between the federal government and Tigrayan political forces, as well as the slow pace of rebuilding civilian institutions.
In Amhara, meanwhile, the indefinite postponement of voting in several constituencies reflects the continuation of confrontations between the federal government and Fano fighters. This issue is particularly significant because Amhara is the second-largest region in terms of parliamentary representation, holding 138 seats. Any instability there inevitably affects the country’s broader political balance.
The distribution of parliamentary seats reveals important strategic realities. Oromia holds 178 of the 547 parliamentary seats, representing approximately 32.5 percent of parliament, while Amhara possesses 138 seats, accounting for roughly 25.2 percent. Together, these two regions control nearly 58 percent of the House of Peoples’ Representatives.
These figures confirm that political power in Ethiopia remains closely linked to the balance between the country’s two largest ethnic groups—the Oromo and the Amhara. Any deterioration in relations among political elites within these regions could directly affect the stability of the federal state as a whole.
Economically, the elections come at an exceptionally sensitive moment. The Ethiopian government is implementing a comprehensive reform program in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, including the liberalization of the Ethiopian birr’s exchange rate in July 2024. While these measures aim to attract foreign investment and improve macroeconomic indicators, they have also contributed to rising inflation and increased pressure on household living standards.
The government therefore faces a dual challenge: achieving financial stability on one hand while responding to growing social demands on the other. Consequently, the 2026 elections can be viewed as an indirect referendum on the economic policies adopted by Abiy Ahmed’s administration in recent years.
From a security standpoint, a striking paradox emerges. On one hand, the government has managed to preserve the unity of the state and prevent institutional collapse despite wars and conflicts. On the other hand, large parts of the country continue to experience varying levels of armed violence and instability.
For this reason, the success of the electoral process should not be measured solely by voter turnout or by the number of seats secured by the ruling party. Rather, it should be assessed by the state’s ability to manage ethnic and political diversity without descending once again into cycles of armed conflict.
Strategically speaking, the 2026 elections can be viewed as a transitional phase rather than a decisive turning point. Ethiopia has yet to resolve its fundamental questions regarding the nature of ethnic federalism, the limits of regional authority, the future of national dialogue, and mechanisms for sharing power and wealth among the country’s diverse nationalities.
The Prosperity Party is likely to emerge victorious and retain a comfortable majority. However, the real challenge will not be electoral victory itself, but transforming that victory into genuine political legitimacy capable of accommodating the growing ethnic, security, and economic contradictions within the state.
Ultimately, Ethiopia’s 2026 elections appear to be less about changing power and more about redefining the state. They are elections conducted under the shadow of guns, threats, and exclusion—caught between the promises of development and the risks of fragmentation, between aspirations for regional influence and the realities of internal divisions.
Therefore, the most important question after the results are announced will not be: Who won? Rather, it will be: Has Ethiopia moved closer to sustainable stability, or is it merely postponing the confrontation with its structural crises to another round of political struggle? .
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