Between Illusions of Egypt’s Declining Power and the Realities of Geopolitics: A Critical Reading of Ethiopia’s Confused Narrative

A response to the Ethiopian report published by the Ethiopian Foreign Affairs Institute:
“Egypt’s Weakening Arab Leverage and Ethiopia’s Strategic Opening” – IFA

Ramy Zohdy — African Affairs Expert

Recently, there has been a growing wave of writings issued by some Ethiopian institutions and think tanks attempting to promote a narrative claiming that Egypt has lost its traditional instruments of regional influence, and that Ethiopia has succeeded in building a new strategic reality that opens broader horizons in the Nile Basin, the Horn of Africa, and the Red Sea.

Among the latest of these narratives is a publication by the Ethiopian Foreign Affairs Institute titled “Egypt’s Weakening Arab Influence and Ethiopia’s Strategic Opening.” This argument deserves scrutiny, not only for its political conclusions, but also for what it reveals about the prevailing strategic mindset within certain circles of opinion-making in Addis Ababa.

To begin with, there is no dispute that the regional environment of the 1950s and 1960s has changed fundamentally, and that the Arab system itself has undergone profound transformations that affected intra-regional relations and state priorities.

However, the methodological flaw in the article lies in assuming that the decline of Arab nationalist discourse necessarily implies a decline in Egyptian power, Egypt has never derived its influence solely from slogans; rather, it draws strength from a unique geographic position linking Asia, Africa, and Europe, from its control over one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints, and from its demographic, military, and diplomatic weight, in addition to its long-standing presence within Arab, African, and international institutions.

Egypt’s power today is not based on Nasser-era legacy, as some suggest, but on a complex network of interests, alliances, and national capabilities that make it an indispensable actor in the equations of the Middle East, the Red Sea, and Africa.

Therefore, framing Egyptian influence as declining simply because Arab nationalism has weakened is a reductive reading that ignores the transformations the Egyptian state itself has undergone in recent decades.

Interestingly, the article presents the completion of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) as evidence of Egypt’s failure and Ethiopia’s victory. In reality, this conclusion reflects a clear confusion between imposing facts on the ground and acquiring legitimacy.

Egypt’s issue has never been with the Ethiopian people’s right to development or energy production. Cairo has not opposed the idea of the dam as a development project. Rather, the dispute has centered on the unilateral management of a shared international water resource and Ethiopia’s refusal to reach a legally binding agreement regulating filling and operation rules in a way that prevents significant harm to downstream countries.

Yes, Ethiopia has succeeded in constructing the dam, but it has not yet operated as planned. This does not negate the fact that the legal and political dispute remains unresolved, nor does it change the reality that international water law is based on the principles of “no significant harm,” consultation, cooperation, and agreement. Mega-projects are not measured only by a state’s ability to build them, but also by its ability to integrate them within a stable legal framework that secures the interests of all parties.

The article also ignores the fact that Egypt has, in recent years, succeeded in elevating the issue of water security to regional and international levels, consolidating the concept of Egyptian water security as an integral part of national security. It has also built an extensive network of partnerships across Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Red Sea—contradicting the image the author attempts to portray of a state gradually losing influence, while in reality Egypt’s regional engagement has been expanding in unprecedented ways.

Regarding the Red Sea, the Ethiopian narrative deliberately conflates legitimate interests with sovereign rights. No one denies that Ethiopia has economic, commercial, and security interests linked to the Red Sea, and that stability in this vital corridor directly affects Ethiopia’s economy.

However, possessing interests does not automatically grant the right to reshape the governing rules of a maritime region or to bypass the legally recognized rights of coastal states. International law and geography clearly distinguish between coastal and landlocked states, and between economic cooperation and participation in sovereignty and maritime security arrangements. This is particularly relevant given that there are 44 landlocked countries in the world, 16 of them in Africa.

The article further portrays Ethiopia as a rising power imposing new realities on all actors, while overlooking the structural challenges the Ethiopian state continues to face—whether in terms of internal cohesion, political stability, ethnic balance, or economic pressures. True power is not measured solely by population size or growth rates, but also by institutional stability and the capacity to manage internal diversity and translate resources into sustainable influence.

In my assessment, the real challenge facing the region is not Ethiopia’s rise or Egypt’s decline, as some narratives suggest, but rather the construction of a new regional equation based on shared interests, respect for international law, and rejection of unilateral faits accomplis.

Egyptian water security is not a matter of influence or hegemony; it is an existential issue for a state whose more than one hundred million citizens rely almost entirely on the Nile. At the same time, Ethiopian development is a legitimate right that cannot be denied or undermined.

Therefore, the future of the region will not be shaped by dominance narratives or propaganda framing, but by the ability to balance rights and obligations, development and security, national interests and regional responsibilities.

Betting on the idea that Egypt has lost its place or that history has moved beyond its role is a reading that disregards the realities of geography, history, and politics alike.

The region has indeed changed, but what has not changed is that Egypt will remain one of the main pillars of regional stability, Any sustainable arrangement in the Nile Basin, the Red Sea, or the Horn of Africa will only succeed if it takes into account the legitimate interests of all parties, foremost among them Egypt’s right to water security and the region’s peoples’ right to development and stability.

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